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In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
System Council

U-3,

IBEW
AWARD OF ARBITRATORS

and
Jersey Central Power and Light Co.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrators and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD
Consistent with a prior Award dated July
12, 1977 rendered by the majority of a
Board of Arbitration under the chairmanship of Arbitrator Benjamin H. Wolf, which
for the reasons set forth in the accompanying
Opinion of the undersigned Chairman is accorded
respect as applicable to the instant case, the
Company did not have just cause for the written
warning and three day suspension of J. Rosko in
1976. The warning shall be expunged from Mr.
Rosko's record and he shall be made whole for
three days loss of pay.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

Robert Detrick
Concurring

DATED: May 29, 1979
STATE OF: New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )

John J. Westervelt
Dissenting

On this 29th day of May, 1979, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
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DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

)
)ss':

On this
day of
1979, before me personally
came and appeared Robert Detrick • to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

)ss . :
)

On this
day of
1979, before me personally
came and appeared John J. Westervelt to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
System Council

U-3,

IBEW
OPINION OF CHAIRMAN

and
Jersey Central Power and Light Co.

In accordance with the arbitration provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement between System Council U-3,
IBEW, hereinafter referred to as the "Union", and Jersey Central
Power and Light Co., hereinafter referred to as the "Company",
the Undersigned was designated as the Chairman of a tri-partite
Board of Arbitration, to hear and decide with the Union and
Company designees to said Board, the following stipulated issue:
Did the Company have just cause for the
written warning and three day suspension
of J. Rosko in 1976? If not what shall be
the remedy?
A hearing was held in South Plainfield, New Jersey on
January 17, 1979 at which time representatives of the Union and
Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Messrs. Robert Detrick and John J. Westervelt served respectively
as the Union and Company Arbitrators on the Board of Arbitration.
The Arbitrators' Oath was waived; the parties filed post-hearing
briefs or memorandum; and the Board of Arbitration met in executive session on April 12, 1979.
Mr. Rosko hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" was
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given a written warning and a three day suspension for what the
Company deemed to be an excessive quantity of absences, many of
them on Mondays and Fridays.

It is stipulated that over an

eleven year period between 1977 and 1977 he was absent one
hundred and eighty five days, seventy five of them on a Monday
or a Friday.

The discipline imposed is in accordance with the

Company's "absentee control program."

The Chairman ruled that

the general validity of that program was not before the Board
of Arbitration in this proceeding.
The Union asserts, and the Company stipulates, that each of
the grievant's absences was due to claimed illness; that in each
of the years, the number of those absences may have equalled but
did not exceed the annual number of sick days permitted an
employee with the grievant's seniority under the collective bargaining agreement; that at times the grievant presented medical
statements in substantiation of the claimed illness; and that in
no instance had the Company established that he was not sick on
the days he was out.
The Union relies heavily on a prior Award by an Arbitration
Board under the chairmanship of Arbitrator Benjamin H. Wolf.
That case involved employee Robert E. DePew, Jr. whose absentee
record (as also stipulated herein by the parties) was not significantly different from the absentee record of the grievant,
though DePew had a worse record of tardiness.

A majority of the

Wolf Board reversed the discipline imposed on DePew.

In sum,

-3Mr. Wolf stated that where an employee's absences are claimed
to be due to illness; where in quantity they do not exceed the
number of sick days allowed under the contract; and where there
is no evidence that the claim of illness was untrue, the Company
had no grounds to impose discipline.

To quote Mr. Wolf:

"The Company claims the right to terminate
employees for excessive absences even when
they are due to illness and cites as authority How Arbitration Works, a treatise by the
Elkouris. It is, of course, generally recognized
that employers may do so. No employer must
forever keep an employee who is excessively ill.
The question, however, is when an employee's
illness is excessive. It cannot be deemed excessive if it is within the number permitted
and paid for under the agreement.
To summarize, while an employer may institute
an absentee control program it does not supersede the collective agreement. If an employer
grants sick leave pay it acknowledges that the
employee is genuinely sick. If an employee is
to be disciplined for excessive sickness it may
not be for sick days permitted under the agreement.
The Union asserts that the Wolf decision is the defintive
contract interpretation of the substantive issue involved in the
instant case as in the DePew case; that the Company is bound to
it; and that that prior decision should not be overturned by this
Arbitrator or by this Arbitration Board.
We all know that as a matter of technical law arbitrators
are not bound by prior decisions of other arbitrators.

However,

it is well settled that where the substantive issue is the same;
where the parties are the same; and where the same contract

-4provisions are involved, a prior interpretative decision, whether
it be set forth in the Award or in the accompanying

Opinion,

should be respected if its conclusions are reasonable

and

supported by the evidence, and where the contract language involved is logically susceptible to the interpretation given.

Put

another way, prior decisions, though not binding, and though
they need not be followed, are generally not overturned in
subsequent similar matters unless the subsequent arbitrator concludes that they are palpably wrong.
In the instant case I may well be in disagreement with Mr.
Wolf's conclusion.

But there is no dispute that the issue before

Mr. Wolf was substantively the same as the issue in the instant
case, and of course the parties and the contract provisions are
the same.

Had the case before me been of first impression, it

is quite possible that my analysis would have included the view
that an unusually large number of absences due to claimed illnesses, many of which took place on Mondays and Fridays, raised
suspicions regarding the bona fides of the claimed illnesses,
and constituted a prima facie but rebuttable case for discipline.
As such the burden would shift to the grievant and the Union on
his behalf to show that the absences, particularly those on Fridays
and Mondays were medically rooted.

But such views not withstanding,

I cannot find that Mr. Wolf's reasoning was unreasonable or unsupported by the facts; nor can I find that the "just cause"
provision of the contract and the contractual sick leave benefits

-5are not logically susceptible to Mr. Wolf's interpretation.

In

short, while Mr. Wolf and I may disagree, I cannot say that his
interpretation is so palpably wrong or insupportable under the
facts and contract terms as to be disregarded.
The reasons for the foregoing rules are obvious and I am
sure well known to the parties herein.

Inconsistent decisions,

which provide divergent interpretations of the same contract
provisions under substantially similar facts leave the parties
with unsettled meanings of their contract.

In the instant

situation it would impose discipline on one employee where anoth
similarly situated, was absolved.

It would result in the uneven

application of "justice" and leave the parties unclear as to how
subsequent similar situations should be handled.

The better

approach is to maintain "consistency", provided the foregoing
conditions have been met, leaving resolution of the disagreement
between the parties to negotiation.
A stern caveat to the Union and its members.

This decision

separately or taken together with the decision by Arbitrator
Wolf, should not be deemed or relied upon as a license automatically to permit absences based on claimed illness up to the
maximum of the contractual sick leave benefit.

As Mr. Wolf

rightly pointed out regarding the sick leave benefit:
"Of course, the employee must be genuinely ill."
Hence it should be clear that the Company has both the
contractual and managerial right to require employees to substantiate the legitimacy of their claimed illnesses by acceptable

,
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medical proof, and also has the right to conduct appropriate
sick leave investigations including visitations to the home
of the employee claiming illness.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman
Dated: May 29, 1979

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
"™ — —"• — "^""•"••™— » — » « —• _ _ « _ • — . • _ _ _ • _ . _ _ _ . » »— »

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local

1381,

IBEW

AWARD
Case No. 1730 0361 78

and
Long Island Lighting Company

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrators, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties make the following AWARD:
Except as hereinafter provided with regard
to retroactivity, the terms and conditions
of the negotiated agreement, meaning the
contract between Local 1381, IBEW and Long
Island Lighting Company shall not be modified.
So far as the issues in this case are concerned
the contract between the above named parties
shall provide for a 5 per cent wage increase
the first year, a 5 per cent wage increase the
second year, a second paid 15 minute break,
and a floating holiday. Retroactivity shall
be for the period July 1, 1978 to September
15, 1978 and again from December 8, 1978.
There shall be no retroactivity for the period
September 15, 1978 to December 8, 1978 as this
was the period during which the employees rejected the tentative agreement. We deem such
rejection as a waiver of retroactivity during
that period.

DATED: May 7, 1979

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

Matthew Procelli
Concurring
Dissenting

Robert S. Detrick
Concurring
Dissenting

?
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DATED: May 7, 1979
STATE OF New York )gs .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this seventh day of May, 1979, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

DATED: May
1979
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this
day of May, 1979, before me personally
came and appeared Matthew Procelli to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

DATED: May
1979
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

.

On this
day of May, 1979, before me personally
came and appeared Robert Detrick to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 1381, IBEW

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
Case No. 1730 0361 78

and
Long Island Lighting Company

The stipulated issue is:
Shall the terms and conditions of the abovementioned negotiated agreement, meaning the
contract between Local 1381, IBEW and Long
Island Lighting Company, be modified in any
way, either more favorable or less favorable
to either party and, if so, what shall such
modifications be?
The Undersigned was selected as Chairman of the Board of
Arbitration.

Messrs. Matthew

Procelli and Robert S. Detrick served

respectively as the Company and Union designees on the Board of
Arbitration.
A hearing was held at the Company offices on March 8, 1979,
at which time representatives of the above named parties appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
was waived.

The Arbitrators' Oath

The Board of Arbitration met in executive session on

April 19, 1979.
This Arbitrator is an unabashed supporter of the collective
bargaining process.

I believe that terms and conditions of em-

ployment should be freely negotiated by and between the employer
and the duly selected and authorized union by and on behalf of the
employees.

I also believe that if the union has represented its

members fully and fairly, has bargained diligently and has achieved
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as a tentative agreement what it believes to be the best terms
and conditions then obtainable, the union membership should
accept and ratify that tentative agreement as the formal contract.
In the instant case the above named Union is the duly
selected and authorized representative of the employees involved.
It is clear to me that the Union fully and fairly represented its
members, and bargained diligently on their behalf.

It obtained

significant improvements in terms and conditions of employment
which represented the "best deal" then obtainable.

That tentative

agreement, so far as is relevant hereto, included a wage increase
of 5 per cent the first year, a similar wage increase of 5 per cen
the second year, and second paid 15 minute break, and a floating
holidayo

I conclude that that tentative agreement should have

been accepted and ratified by the membership. The Award of the
Board of Arbitration will so provide with appropriate rulings
regarding retroactivity.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman
DATED: May 7,

1979

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
International Industrial Production
Employees Union, Local 42

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330 0693 79

and
Lumex, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Leroy Robinson? If not what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held on August 27, 1979 at which time Mr.
Robinson, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
It is well settled that insubordination warrants discipline
including summary discharge, regardless of the employee's prior
disciplinary and/or work record.

If the

misconduct of insubordin-

ation has been shown, and the ultimate permissable penalty of dismissal has been imposed, the arbitrator should not substitute his
judgement for that of the employer by reducing that penalty, even
if he believes a lesser disciplinary action would have been adequate
Here, I agree with the Company's determination that the
grievant was insubordinate.

Angrily, he tore up a disciplinary

warning slip "in the foreman's face"; and in the presence of other
employees.

It was a manifest defiant and disrespectful act, con-

temptuous of the foreman's authority and responsibility.
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Whether that warning notice which produced the incident
was justified or whether the grievant's absence the day before
should have been excused on medical grounds, are immaterial.

The

refusal of the foreman to give the grievant the day off "to see a
dentist" and/or the propriety of the warning notice for that days
absence, were both matters that could and should have been grieved,
if the grievant and the Union on his behalf deemed them wrong.

The

grievance procedure of the contract, including arbitration is fully
apable of redlressing any wrongfull action by the Company and the
rievant had neither reason nor justification to "reject" the warnng notice in the publicly defiant and disrespectful manner he
employed.
Significantly, the grievant did not assert that he acted
precipitously, in a fit of anger, but rather that he tore up the
yarning notice after conferring with and being advised to do so by
his shop steward.

The steward did not testify in corroboration.

To my mind that means that the grievant's act was deliberate and
committed after he had time to think of its consequences and was not
an immediate, emotional reaction, without thought.
Though, as previously stated not traditionally

relevant,

the grievant's prior disciplinary record is not unblemished.

He

had previously received a warning and a one day suspension (reduced
from three days after the Union's intervention on his behalf) for
poor attendance.
Under the circumstance, though to my mind a lengthy

suspension

rather than dismissal would have been an adequate punishment, the
ompany had the right to impose the more severe penalty, and I
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cannot find that its decision to do so was without "just cause" or
violative of the contract.
Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator and having been duly sworn,and having duly heard the
proofs and allegations of the above named parties makes the
following AWARD:

There was just cause for the discharge
of Leroy Robinson.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: September 3, 1979
STATE OF New York )gg
COUNTY OF New York ) " " "
On this third day of September, 1979 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Volunary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Bakery & Confectionary Workers
International Union, Local 719
and

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330 0921 78

Nabisco, Inc.

The issue is the Union's grievance dated June 3, 1977
which reads:
Our agreement was violated by the Company
by not notify(ing) the Union about electric
work performed by outside contract on the
propane system. Work that our men can do.
Asking 2 men 7 days pay.
Hearings were held on November 15, 1978, February 12 and
April 16, 1979 at which time representatives of the Union and
Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses
It is the Union's contention that the electrical wiring
and "hookup" of the spare air compressor installed as part of
certain propane additions should have been assigned to and performed by bargaining unit electricians and not by an outside
contractor.
Effective January 30, 1973 the parties agreed on the
following stipulated procedure:
The Company will inform the steward or any
authorized Union representative of the proposed job prior to contract commitments to
outside firms.
The authorized Union representative will, in
turn, arrange a meeting within the skills
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involved to determine if a job can be
done by bargaining unit personnel.
It is mutually agreed between Company
and Union representatives if a job cannot be performed by bargaining Union
personnel for any valid reason, a memorandum will be made and duly signed by
proper representatives to this effect.
On December 1, 1976 duly authorized representatives of
the Union and Company reached the following agreement:
Installation of a shed addition, concrete
slab, spare air compressor, liquid pump
and necessary piping to. be performed by
an outside contractor.
The Union claims that its representative was led to
believe that the air compressor would be installed in place but
that it would not be hooked up electrically as part of the
installation.

It asserts that its steward was deceived by the

Company into believing that the electrical work would be reserved for bargaining unit electricians.

The Union points out

that the Company did not make the installation plans or the
contracts with the contractor available to the steward.

Had

those plans and contracts been made known, the Union contends
they would have disclosed that the contractor was to perform the
electrical work and the Union would have immediately objected
and claimed the work.

The Union argues that in the absence of

such disclosure it had reasonable grounds to believe that the
compressor would not be hooked up electrically by the contractor
but that that work would ultimately be done by the unit electricians when the spare compressor was activated.
The Company asserts that the full installation of all of
the equipment and items referred to in Requisition 12287, in1. REQUISITION 12287
Propane additions; shed, pump, comprssor

-3cluding the electrical work attendant to the spare air compressor,
was to be installed by the contractor under the vendor agreement
and that the disputed electrical work was an integral part of
the contract and part of the vendor's guarantee which went along
with the installation.
It is apparent to me that I need not decide whether the
bargaining unit electricians possessed the skills to perform the
disputed electrical work, nor need I determine whether the work
"cannot be performed by bargaining unit personnel for any valid
reason" within the meaning of the January 30, 1973 stipulation.
The fact is that inasmuch as on December 1, 1976 the parties
jointly entered into "a memorandum....duly signed by proper
representatives...." pursuant to the 1973 stipulation, those
questions are mooted and preempted by the latter agreement.
Therefore the issue is a narrow one,

It is

whether the

December 1, 1976 memorandum providing for the "installation of
a

spare air compressor....by an outside contractor" included

therein and contemplated the electrical hookup of that compressor
by the contractor; or whether that work was reserved for bargaining unit electricians.
I conclude the former,.

As I see it the Union has wrongly

placed the full burden on the Company with regard to disclosure
of the work to be performed by the outside contractor.

The

Company did not state or indicate that the electrical work was
not to be performed by the contractor.

Nor did the Company in

any way state or otherwise inform the Union that that electrical
work was to be later undertaken by the bargaining unit electricians.

|

The fact is that any normal reading of the December 1,

-41976 memorandum creates a presumption that the outside contractor was to perform all work involved in the installation
of the equipment and items referred to therein, and the customary interpretation of the word "installation" includes those
normal tasks attendant to making the equipment operational.
That would include the necessary electrical work for any operation of the air compressor.
Significant in my judgement is that the procedure followed
in this case was not unique, but was the usual method used by
the parties in giving notice to and considering whether certain
work was to be "farmed out" or assigned to the bargaining unit.
Under the 1973 stipulation there is as much a burden on the
Union to seek out information, and ask questions regarding all
of the relevant details of the work to be performed as there is
on the Company to disclose.

As the Union representative assumes

the responsibility of meeting with the skilled trades involved
to determine if the job can be done by bargaining unit personnel
he, perforce, has the responsbility prior to entering into a
memorandum like the one of December 1, 1976, of inquiring of
the Company what precise work the Company proposes to assign
to outside firms.

Indeed the Union had had considerable prior

experience with this very same procedure.

In prior instances,

as well as in prior grievances resulting from the implementation
of this procedure, the Union sought and obtained information regarding all aspects of the work to be performed, and acted in
many instances to protect the interests of the bargaining unit
by claiming certain work which the bargaining unit could perform
In the instant case I conclude that it was the duty of

-5the Union steward to question the Company about all the work
which the contractor was to perform in connection with the installation of the spare air compressor, particularly in view of
the aforesaid presumption that a general agreement to have that
piece of equipment installed by an outside contractor carried
with it and included the necessary electrical work to make the
spare air compressor operational.

In view of that presumption,

as well as the long standing experience and practice which the
Union had with this procedure, I do not find that the Company
had any special duty to notify the Union specifically that the
installation of the spare air compressor included the electrical
hookup of that piece of equipment.

In short I find that that

latter work is and was an implicit part of the

installation.

If any special part of an installation, such as an electrical
hookup was to be reserved for the bargaining unit electricians,
the Union representative should have expressly excluded that
work from assignment to the contractor, either as an explicit
exception within the memorandum, or by an express verbal agreement before the memorandum was signed.

Neither was done.

Hence

I find no basis to support the Union's claim that the Company
deceived or even misled the Union's steward.
Under the foregoing circumstances I must conclude that
with the execution of the December 1, 1976 memorandum by "proper
representatives" of the Company and the Union, the Company had
reasonable grounds to believe that the installation of the spare
air compressor included its electrical hookup, and that that
work was properly given to and performed by the outside contractor.
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The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above named parties makes the following
AWARD:
The Union's grievance dated June 3,
1977 is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: September 28, 1979
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )s " '
On this twenty-eighth day of September, 1979 before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Locals 2222,
2313, 2315, 2320-27

AWARD OF ARBITRATORS

and
New England Telephone Company

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrators and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties make the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate Article 24.05
(c) of the 1971 Agreement between the
parties.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

Ralph Hannabury
Concurring

John Langlois
Dissenting

-2-

DATED: December 20, 1979
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) " "
On this twentieth day of December, 1979, before me personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known
to me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

DATED: December
1979
STATE OF Massachusetts)
COUNTY OF
) SS - :
On this
day of December 1979, before me personally came and appeared Ralph Hannabury to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

DATED: December
1979
STATE OF Massachusetts) g
COUNTY OF
)S
On this
day of December, 1979, before me personally came and appeared John Langlois to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Locals 2222,
2313, 2315, 2320-27

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
Case #1130 0362 72

and
New England Telephone Company

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate Article 24.05(c)
of the 1971 Agreement between the parties?
If so what shall be the remedy if any, under
said Agreement?
A hearing was duly held at which time all concerned were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Oath of the Board

of Arbitration was waived; the parties filed post-hearing
briefs; and two executive sessions of the Board of Arbitration
were held.
Article 24.05(c) reads:
"24.05 Eligibility to apply for transfer to
fill vacancies shall be as follows:

(c)
To rated Basic Classes of Work:
An employee shall become eligible to apply
for transfer following twelve (12) months
on present assignment. This restriction will
not apply to employees who met the requirements
for rated Basic Classes of Work on date of
employment."
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What is involved is whether Ms. Margaret Alymer, though
undisputedly qualified, was eligible under the foregoing contract
provision for transfer to the job of Station Assigner after working
a little more than two months as a Plant Clerk.
The Union claims that the job of Plant Clerk was Ms. Alymer's
"present assignment" within the meaning of the foregoing

contract

provision; that she had not worked at least twelve months in
that assignment; and therefore was ineligible to be awarded the
job of Station Assigner.
It is the Company's contention that the phrase "present
assignment" means service within the "Basic Class" of clerical
work; that Ms. Alymer had spent over two years in that Class
(from December 7, 1970 to December 26, 1971 as a Field Clerk;
and from December 26, 1971 to March 5, 1972 as a Plant Clerk);
and consequently met the minimum twelve month "residency" requirement for transfer to the job of Station Assigner.
The parties have stipulated that if Ms. Alymer was contractually eligible, she was entitled to the job; but that if not the
job should have been awarded to Ms. Marjorie Denningham.
While a traditional interpretation of the phrase "present
assignment" might lead logically to the conclusion that it means
the particular job which an employee occupies at the time he is
transferred under 24.05(c), in this case Ms. Alymer's job as a
Plant Clerk, I conclude based on the entire record, particularly
a reading of all of the provisions of Article 24.05, that the

-3phrase "present assignment" under paragraph (c) means jobs within a Basic Class of Work.

In the instant case it would apply to

Ms. Alymer's work experience both as a Field Clerk and Plant
Clerk, thereby satisfying the minimum twelve month residency
requirement.
Article 24.05 sets up three circumstances for transfer.
Paragraph (a), by its introductory language sets conditions for
transfers within the same rated Basic Class of Work or from
Basic Class of Work #2 to Basic Class of Work #1 (emphasis added)
Paragraph (b) sets up conditions for transfer between rated
Basic Classes of Work (emphasis added).
Considering the foregoing introductory language for transfers
under paragraphs (a) and (b), it is clear to me that the common
denominator or categories for transfers is between and within
Basic Classes of Work or rated Basic Classes of Work. Those intro'
ductory explanations perforce define the phrase "present assignment" found in paragraph (a) and together with even more explicit
language in paragraph (b) the phrases "initial assignment" and
"subsequent

assignment."

It follows, in my view, that paragraph (c) should be and was
intended to be consistent with paragraphs (a) and (b).

The

introductory language of paragraph (c) reads:
"To rated Basic Classes of Work."
As paragraphs (a) and (b) set forth transfer movement between

-4Basic Classes of Work and between Rated Basic Classes of Work,
as well as within the same rated Basic Class of Work, paragraph
(c) must apply to transfer movement from a particular source or
location "to rated Basic Classes of Work."

In the instant case

the transfer was from the Basic Class of Clerical Work to a rated
Basic Class of Work.

For consistency with paragraphs (a) and (b)

I find implicit within the introductory language of paragraph (c)
so far as the instant case is concerned, the language From Basic
Classes of Work to rated Basic Classes of Work.

(underscored is

the implicit language)
On that basis, as in paragraphs

(a) and (b), the introductory

language provides the definition of the phrase "present assignment" found in the body of paragraph (c).

And under the circum-

stances of this case, that latter phrase means a transfer from
the Basic Class of Clerical Work to a rated Basic Class of Work.
More specifically it means Ms. Alymer's transfer from the Clerica
Class, which included her services both as a Field Clerk and a
Plant Clerk, to Station Assigner a job within a rated Basic
Class of Work.
I am satisfied that the foregoing contractual analysis is
consistent with and supported in the record by probative testimony
on what was intended when Article 24.05 was negotiated by and
between the parties in contract negotiations.
Accordingly the Union's grievance is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
New Haven Federation of Teachers

AWARD
Case #1239 0349 78

and
New Haven Board of Education

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above named parties makes the following
AWARD
Based on the testimony of the school
principal together with the final testimony of the grievant herself, I conclude
that the principal did observe the grievant's
classes; did discuss with her what he considered to be her deficiencies; and did make
suggestions and recommendations for improvement.
I believe his observations, findings and recommendations would have been more effective
and impressive had they been structured and
institutionalized in formal meetings and
written reports, but the contract does not require that degree of formality.
Accordingly, I find that the principal met at
least the minimum procedural requirements of
Article VIII Section 2 of the contract, and
therefore did not violate that contract provision in failing to follow the procedural steps
thereof with regard to the evaluation of Maxine
Richardson.
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The Arbitrator's fee and expenses of the
hearing scheduled for April 4, 1979 at
which the Board of Education failed to
appear, shall be borne by the Board. The
balance of the Arbitrator's fee and expenses
for the subsequent hearing and for study and
preparation of the Award shall be shared
equally.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATE: June 21, 1979
STATE OF New York ).
COUNTY OF New York )'"
On this 21st day of June 1979, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN
UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCATION
and
CITY OF NEW YORK (FIRE DEPARTMENT)

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Uniformed Firefighters Association
-and-

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #A-829-79
Case #A-841-79

City of New York (Fire Department)

Respectively at hearings on June 27th and July 2nd, 1979
the above named parties stipulated and litigated the following
issues:
1. Has the Fire Department improperly denied
the requests of Daniel Gallagher and John
Thomas for reimbursement for lost or destroyed personal belongings? If so what shall be
the remedy?
2. Whether the Fire Department violated the
collective bargaining agreement by scheduling probationary firemen to report to the
Fire Department medical office on the offtours for Fourth Grade medical examination?
If so what shall be the remedy?
At the hearings, representatives of the parties appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses„

The Arbitrator's Oath

was waived. Post-hearing briefs were filed.
Issue No. 1
Undisputedly relevant is Section 487a-17.0 of the Administrative Code which reads:

-2Whenever any member of the uniformed force
of the Department, while in the actual performance of his duty shall lose or have destroyed any of his personal belongings and
shall present satisfactory proof thereof to
the commissioner, such member shall be reimbursed to the extent of the loss sustained,
at the expense of the City.
What is sharply disputed is the interpretation and applica
tion of the foregoing, particularly

the meaning of "personal be-

longings. "
In the instant case I find that I need not resolve the
major interpretative dispute between the parties.

Instead I am

persuaded that the City is not an absolute guarantor against losses
under all circumstances

and that implicit within the foregoing

provision so far as this case is concerned, is that the employee
involved be free of any material contributory negligence in the
loss.

In this case Fireman Gallagher lost his eyeglasses and

Fireman Thomas lost his "divers" wrist watch, both in the course
of line of duty work.

However, Gallagher carried his glasses in

the breast pocket of his shirt.

The glasses were in no way securec

either by a clip, safety pin, or any other device.

It is not

surprising therefore that they fell out of the pocket as he leaned
over from a building height and were lost.

Assuming that the

glasses were needed for the performance of his assigned duties at
that time, I believe that he knew or should have anticipated the
nature of the assignment and should have taken steps to better insure the security of his eyeglasses.
materially contributed to their loss.

That he did not do so

-3Thomas is the Department's unofficial "diver."

At times

he is called on for rescue and other operations underwater.

In

readiness for any such assignment he properly, and understandably
wears a special divers wrist watch which is essential to his safety
when engaged in diving operations.
watch was lost.

He was not so engaged when the

Rather he was at work extricating a person from

a car buried under gravel from an overturned gravel truck.

Much

of the digging was done by hand, during which the watch was lost.
It seems to me that without any significant loss of time Thomas
could have removed his watch for that particular assignment.

The

evidence shows that when called out for that rescue operation he
knew it did not involve diving.
ment with him.

He carried no other diving equip-

At the firehouse or enroute, the watch should have

been removed, left in the firehouse, left in the rescue vehicle
or placed elsewhere (including possibly in his trousers pocket)
before beginning digging in the gravel.

The grievant does not

claim that at the scene he had no time to remove the watch, if
time was of the essence to extricate the victim.

Rather his

contention simply is that he wears the watch at all times to be
ready in case he is called upon for a diving operation.

Under that

circumstance I consider it reasonable and prudent for him to have
removed the watch when the assignment did not involve diving.

His

failure to do so materially contributed to its loss.
Accordingly, without determining in this proceeding whether
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the eyeglasses and wrist watch involved were personal belongings
within the meaning of the Administrative

Code, and even though

they were lost in the performance of their duties and proof of
loss supplied, the grievants' requests for reimbursement are
denied.
Issue No. 2
The Fourth Grade medical examination is an essential requirement for probationary firemen.

Satisfactory completion of

that examination is a prerequisite to a permanent

appointment.

The Department first scheduled those examination "on-tours",
which had the effect of allegedly contravening
requirements of the contract.

the minimum manning

When the Union complained the

Department ceased that practice, and stated in the course of this
arbitration hearing that it does not intend to resume examinations
"on-tour."

Accordingly that aspect of the original grievance is

not before me, but the rights of the parties are reserved, in the
event that the Department resumes "on-tour" examinations with
attendant reductions in minimum manning.
Considering the essentiality of the medical examination for
probationary firemen, and the fact that their permanent status is
not achieved until, among other things, that medical examination
is successfully completed, I am not prepared to conclude that the
probationary firemen involved are entitled to compensation for the
off time devoted to those examinations; nor do I deem it unreasonable for the Department to schedule those mandatorily required
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examinations during off-tour periods. Hence the Union's request
for compensation and/or for an order enjoining the scheduling of
the Fourth Grade medical examination on the "off-tours", are
denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: September 3, 1979
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York ) ''
On this third day of September, 1979 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN
UNIFORMED FIRE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
AND
CITY OF NEW YORK (FIRE DEPARTMENT)

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Uniformed Fire Officers Association

AWARD
Case #A-800-79

and

City of New York (Fire Department)

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the current practice of the
Fire Department with respect to AFID/
AFRD violates a valid and subsisting
agreement, practice or policy, and,
if so, is compliance the appropriate
remedy?
A hearing was held January 29, 1979 at which time representatives of the above named parties appeared and were afforded
full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

I find that the Memorandum of Understanding Between The
Fire Commissioner and The Executive Board of the UFOA, signed by
the then Fire Commissioner Robert 0. Lowery and the then president
of the UFOA, Joseph Lovett and published in the Union's newspaper
Trumpet in January, 1968, the authenticity of which is not disputed by the City, is a continuing, enforceable bilateral agreement, albeit separate from the basic collective bargaining agreement, which may not be changed unilaterally by the Department.
That the Department did not deviate from its terms from
1968 until possibly one special instance in the Borough of
Manhattan in 1977, and thereafter not until the Borough Directives
in 1978 (which gave rise to the instant grievance)

constitutes
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a course of conduct and practice not only in affirmation of the
original agreement, but persuasive evidence of its continued
effectiveness and vitality for the entire ten year period.
As such it is not an "ancient document" as alleged by
the City, but rather a contemporaneously effective instrument
to which the City and the Union are bound.

Consequently the

Department's unilateral Borough Directives which ordered AFID
periods in the afternoon as well as in the morning, and which
require the "make-up" of missed inspections, are violative of
the express contrary provisions of numbered paragraphs 3 and 4
and the next to last full paragraph of the Memorandum of Understanding.
By negotiating and consistently performing under the
terms of the Memorandum, the Department transformed what may have
been a management prerogative into a bilateral condition of
employment and a bargainable issue.

As that bilateral agreement

has remained effective, the City must bargain any changes therein
with the Union.
I agree with the City that a good AFID program is needed
for more effective fire prevention.

Therefore I direct that the

parties forthwith meet and bargain on the question of what changes
if any should be made in the AFID program from those set forth
in the Memorandum.

That bargaining shall be pursuant to the

New York City Collective Bargaining Law, including the impasse
provisions thereof.
Pending the final outcome of that bargaining, the
Department is directed to cease and desist from implementing the

-3AFID program as set forth in the Borough Directives identified
in this record as Union Exhibits 6 through 10, and is directed
to return to and restore the AFID program as set forth in the
Memorandum of Understanding.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: January 31, 1979
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
On this 31st day of January, 1979, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION
-AND- CITY OF NEW YORK (FIRE DEPARTMENT)

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Uniformed Firefighters Association

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
City of New York (Fire Department)
The stipulated issue is:
May the Department unilaterally replace firemen working as ambulance
#4 drivers and in the oxygen therapy
unit with non-uniformed employees?
If not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the Office of Collective Bargaining
on March 19, 1979 at which time representatives of the City and
the Union appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
Limited to this proceeding, without prejudice to any other
matter, and based on the decision of the Board of Collective
Bargaining in Case No. B-7-69, the City waived any challenge to
the arbitrability of the instant dispute.
I decide the issue on narrow, contractual grounds, limited
to the facts and circumstances of this particular case.

My

decision is not intended nor should it be construed as having
any precedential effect on any other matter.
This case does not require a determination of whether the
City may "civilianize" certain fire department jobs and duties
historically performed by firemen.

Nor does it require a finding

of applicability or non-applicability of any aspect of the decision
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of Arbitrator Morris P. Glushien in the Matter of the Arbitration
between Uniformed Sanitationmen's Association and The City of
New York (Case No. A-762-78).

Therefore, regarding the latter,

I find it unnecessary to determine whether the UFA-City of New
York collective bargaining agreement and the firemen job description expressly recited therein may be construed as providing any
job exclusivity to firemen; whether the functions of ambulance
#4 and the oxygen therapy unit are either "fundamental" to or
"tangential" to the principal duties of a fireman; or whether I
agree or disagree with Mr. Glushien's view that "in the public
sector, more than in the private, an arbitrator should be chary
of finding job exclusivity and job guarantee(s)...." Accordingly
my decision may not be construed as dispositive of or even dealing with any of these questions or theories.

Rather it is based

solely on the following rationale.
I find an explicit contract provision which binds the City
to continue the use of drivers who are firemen in the operation
of ambulance #4 and the oxygen therapy unit.

(The 16 incumbent

drivers are made up almost entirely of LSS firefighters who are
disabled from full duty as a result of line of duty injuries.)
Article VA (Medical Offices) of the collective bargaining agreement provides in pertinent part:
The City agrees to implement the
recommendations of the Medical
Practices Review Committee in accordance with Attachment C of this agreement.
The Committee recommended inter alia
The Fire Department Medical Division

-3should be maintained and specific
changes made as recommended below.
It is undisputed that as part of the City's submission to the
Committee, and incorporated within the Committee's recommendation
was an organizational chart of the Medical Division which includec
not only ambulance #4 (encompassing also the constituent oxygen
therapy unit), but also the names of each of the firemen assigned
as drivers.

The Committee's recommended changes did not deal

with the replacement of those named drivers with non-uniformed
personnel.

Consequently I am not prepared to conclude that the

bilaterally negotiated contractual provision in Article VA "to
implement the recommendations of the Medical Practices Review
Committee" did not mean continued operation of ambulance #4 and the
oxygen therapy unit with incumbent firemen drivers.

Moreover,

I am not prepared to conclude (indeed the evidence tends to point
to a contrary conclusion) that the recommendation "that the
Medical Division be maintained," would be fully implemented and
that ambulance #4 and the oxygen therapy unit would be able to
render the same substantive service and medical attention if the
drivers (who historically have been firemen) were replaced by nonuniformed personnel.

Under the unconditional language of Article

VA, which requires the carrying out of the Committee's recommendation, I think the burden is on the City to show that the Medical
Division would be "maintained" in accordance with the Committee's
recommendations if the drivers of those vehicles were changed
from firemen to non-firemen.

The record before me discloses not

only that at least one fireman driver on each shift is EMT trainee

-4but that as firemen who suffered line of duty injuries themselves,
each driver possesses and exhibits a special dedication and concern
for, and in fact assists in rendering special care to injured
firemen who are transported in ambulance #4, and is similarly
responsive to the families of injured firemen, for whom the
ambulance also provides transportation.

The City has not shown

that the non-uniformed driver who would replace the firemen
drivers are or will be similarly trained or possess similar expertise or even dedication.Hence, I see as an unrebutted presumption,
that the recommendations of the Medical Practices Review Committee
would not be implemented as required by Article VA of the contract
unless it included the continued use of firemen as drivers.
In short, Article VA incorporates by express reference into
the contract the recommendations of the Committee and requires the
implementation of those recommendations. The reasonable and logical
interpretation of the pertinent recommendation is that ambulance
#4 and the oxygen therapy unit be "maintained" as before, with
the incumbent drivers. And that the City has bound itself, by
collective agreement with the Union, to the recommended procedures
and organizational

structure of the Medical Department, which

absent that agreement may well be, in significant part at least,
a managerial prerogative not otherwise subject to bilaterally
negotiated conditions or limitations.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Impartial Chairman
under the collective bargaining agreement between the above named
parties, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said
parties, makes the following AWARD:
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The Department may not unilaterally
replace firemen working as ambulance
#4 drivers and in the oxygen therapy
unit with non-uniformed employees.
The Department shall continue the use
of firemen as drivers as before.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: March 21, 1979
STATE OF: New York )
COUNTY OF: New York )
On this twenty first day of March, 1979, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
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The New York City Housing Authority :
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The New York City Housing Authority and City Employees
Union, Local 237, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, on
January 27, 1979, designated the undersigned Impartial Members of the Board of Collective Bargaining as an Arbitration
Panel pursuant to paragraph 15. of the Coalition Economic
Agreement (Joint Exhibit No. 1) to decide the following
issue:
Should Local 237, IBT/Housing Authority
employees be entitled to COLA comparable
to that provided for in the CEA Paragraph
3?
A hearing was held in the matter on January 27,
1979 at which time the parties jointly requested an expedited
Award by the Arbitration Panel with the Opinion of the Panel
to follow in a reasonable time.
The Panel having duly heard the presentations of
the parties and having reviewed the record and exhibits therein make the following Award:
A W A R D
1.

The Housing Authority employees represented

by City Employees Union, Local 237, International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, are entitled to a COLA comparable to that provided in paragraph 3. of the Coalition Economic Agreement.

Docket No. A-806-79

2.

Said emp]_9yees shall be paid that fully pensionable COLA
in accordance with the following payment schedule:
a)

$300 effective January 1, 1979 and

b)

an additional $141 effective January 1,
1980.

2. Those Housing Authority employees represented by City
Employees Union, Local 237, IBT, who are eligible for the NonPensionable Cash Payment (as described in paragraph 5. of the
Coalition Economic Agreement) shall receive said Payment at
the rate of $750 per year effective January 1, 1979.

DATED:

New York, N.Y.
February 7, 1979

. .

Arvid Anderson

ft. I*

/ / I*A-47VXXX1
/ A///."___.

\^/

y* £

'

^X\

/-,^-

^ '-

L . Eisenberg

Eric J. Schmertz

3.
STATE OF NEW YORK )
COUNTY OF NEW YORK ) SS:
On this 7th day of February 1979 before me
personally appeared ARVID ANDERSON, to me known and known
to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he duly acknowledged to me
that he executed the same.
r.

Notary Public

STATE OF NEW YORK )
COUNTY OF NEW YORK)

SS:

SCOTT M. SCHWARTZ
Notary Public, tats '
No. 24-4621933
Qualified in Kings County
Term Expires March 30, 197^

On this 7th day of February 1979 before me
personally appeared WALTER L. EISENBERG, to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he duly acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.

Notary Public

Q

SCOTT M. SCHWARTZ
Notary, Public, State ci New York

No. 24-4521933

STATE OF NEW YORK )
COUNTY OF NEW YORK)

SS:

Qualified in Kings County
[Term Expires March 30, 197 A

On this 7th day of February 1979 before me
personally appeared ERIC J. SCHMERTZ, to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he duly acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.

Notary Public
SCOTT M. SCHWARTZ
Notary Public, State of New York
No. 24-4521933
Qualified in Kings County
iTerm Expires March 30

<
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The New York City Housing Authority :

The New York City Housing Authority (hereinafter
"Authority"), and City Employees' Union, Local 237, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (hereinafter "Union") or.
January 27, 1979, designated the undersigned Impartial Members
of the Board of Collective Bargaining as an Arbitration Panel
pursuant to Paragraph 15, of the Coalition Economic Agreement
(Joint Exhibit No. 1, and hereinafter "CEA") to decide the
following issue:
Should Local 237, IBT/Housing Authority
employees be entitled to COLA comparable
to that provided for in the CEA Paragraph
3?
A hearing was held in the matter on January 27, 1979 at
which time the parties jointly requested an expedited Award
by the Arbitration Panel with the Opinion of the Panel to
follow in a reasonable time.
The Panel having duly heard the presentations of the
parties and having thereafter reviewed the record and exhibits,
issued its Award on February 7, 1979.

We now set forth in this Opinion the basis for our
Award.
BACKGROUND
The CEA provides in pertinent part as follows (at pages

3-4) :
3. "Old COLA"
Current compensation commonly known as "Old
COLA" or "COLA I", whether now being received
or deferred, shall be continued arid paid at
the present rate in all applicable titles held
by the Employees „ Where such COLA- was previously paid in a lump sum, it shall be paid
in equal shares in each regular paycheck received by the Employee. Commencing the first
day of the thirteenth month following the effective date of each Separate Unit Agreement,
the aforesaid "Old COLA" or "COLA I" shall
be equalized for all applicable titles at the
rate of $441 per annum. Commencing the effective date of each Separate Unit Agreement,
the compensation provided for in this paragraph 3 shall be included in the base rate
for all purposes, including but not limited
to, pension, incremental salary levels, and
minimum and maximum rates, except as otherwise hereinafter expressly provided in paragraph 6c of this Agreement.
The CEA also provides in pertinent part as follows (at
pages 13-14):
15. Resolution of Disputes
a. Subject to the subsequent provisions of paragraph
15b, any dispute, controversy or claim concerning
or arising out of the execution, application,
interpretation or performance of any of the
terms or conditions of this Agreement shall be
submitted to arbitration upon the written notice
therefor by any of the parties to this Agreement
to the party with whom such dispute or controversy
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3.

exists. The matter submitted for arbitration
shall be submitted to an arbitration panel
consisting of the three impartial members of
the Board of Collective Bargaining pursuant
to the rules of the Board of Collective Bargaining. Any award in such an arbitration
proceeding shall be final and binding and
shall be enforceable pursuant to Article
75, C.P.L.R.
Implicit in the agreement of the parties here involved
to submit their dispute as to whether Authority employees
represented by the Union should be entitled to COLA comparable
to that provided for in Paragraph 3 (as cited above), is an
understanding that Authority employees should be covered by
the terms of the CEA.

Thus, the issue as developed by the

parties to this proceeding centered on the question of what
the terms and conditions of Authority employee coverage under
the CEA should be with respect to COLA.
City employees, other than Authority employees, covered
by the CEA have received "Old COLA" at a rate of $441 per year,
City employees also have been receiving a Non-Pensionable Cash
Payment ("productivity COLA") at a rate of $750 per year pursuant to the conditions outlined in the two-year CEA.

Under

the terms of prior agreements (in 1976-78), other City employees had received productivity COLA at varying rates, most
at the rate of $882 on an annualized basis.

As a result of

bargaining by the City and the Coalition Unions, a two-year
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CEA was entered into in June of 1978 and the $882 productivity
COLA figure was reduced to a $750 Non-Pensionable Cash Payment.

Authority employees represented by the Union under

the terms of their contract, which expired on December 31,
1978, did not receive Old COLA, but had been receiving productivity COLA payments at an annual rate of $966. Actually
they had not received the full $966 but did receive $630 in
cash payments plus an $85 lump sum amount retroactive to
October 1, 1978.

However, such payments ceased with the

contract's expiration on December 31, 1978.
POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
The Union claims that Authority employees should receive
Old COLA, described in Paragraph 3 of the CEA, at the rate of
$441 per year effective January 1, 1979 and that such a payment
should be fully pensionable.

The Union also demands that

Authority employees be declared eligible for the Non-Pensionable
Cash Payment, described in Paragraph 5 of the CEA, and that they
receive such payment at the rate of $966 per year effective
January 1, 1979.
The position of the Authority and the City is that Authority
employees should receive basically the same benefits as other
City employees, but on a deferred schedule which would permit
the City and the Authority to afford such payments.

The City

pointed out that not all City employees received the $441 COLA
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at one time and, further, that not all City employees had
received the full $441 until the negotiation of the CEA.
The parties here involved made comprehensive arguments
and submitted documented economic statements to support their
respective positions.

The City and the Authority stressed

the economic consequences of the Union demands measured
against the City's ability to pay the requested benefits.
However, in answer to an

explicit question from the Panel,

the City representatives have made clear that neither the City
nor the legal staff of the Financial Control Board, who were
consulted by the City in this matter, contend that there is
an inability to pay the Union's requests within the meaning of
the Financial Emergency Act.

Nevertheless, the City and the

Authority contend that financial prudence and equity dictate
that a grant of the Union's request as submitted would be unjustified and unwise.

The City also pointed out that, while the Au-

thority employees did not receive COLA payments for a threeyear period commencing January 1, 1974, the three-year

contract

(1973-1976) which the Authority employees had negotiated yielded
benefits averaging approximately 38% over the three-year period,
a sum substantially in excess of benefits negotiated by other
City unions.

The City asserts that when this total increase
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in benefits is considered, Authority employees represented
by the Union were not disadvantaged by not receiving the Old
COLA as contrasted to other City, employees who did receive
Old COLA.
The Union argues that it is seeking only such COLA benefits as had been granted to all other City employees covered
by the CEA.

The Union representatives in support of their

claim detailed the numerous cooperative actions which the
Union and the Authority employees have taken to meet the fiscal
crisis faced by the City and the Authority.

Specifically, the

Union cited their participation in the wage deferral agreements,
the reduction of the ITHP, and the yielding of other specific
contractual benefits.

The Union thus urges that equity re-

quires the Authority employees to receive the same Old COLA
benefits without regard to the Union's bargaining success in
any prior contract negotiations.
OPINION
The Panel has considered all of the well-stated, and
at times impassioned, arguments and the exhibits of the parties.
The Panel also recognizes the scope of the fiscal crisis and
constructive role played by the City Administration, the Authority and this Union in the fiscal survival of the City.
There is no need to detail these actions here.
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We are satisfied that there is substantial merit to be
found in the arguments of both parties.

We have concluded

that with reference to the disputed payments equity requires
treating Authority employees as nearly as possible like all
other City employees covered by the CEA, including as well
the COLA provisions

of Paragraph 3 of the CEA.

However, in

order to lessen the cost impact of such coverage, we have
concluded in our Award that such COLA provision should be
applicable under the conditions outlined in our Award, namely,
that the $441 fully pensionable Old COLA should be paid on the
schedule of $300 effective January 1, 1979, and an additional
$141 effective January 1, 1980.

We have further concluded

that productivity COLA should be paid at the rate of $750
per year effective January 1, 1979, and that such payment
should be on a non-pensionable basis, as is the case with
all other City employees.
Most City employees did not receive the $441 Old COLA
payment all at one time, but rather over a two-year period.
By dividing the effective periods for the Old COLA payments,
as we have done, as well as by reducing the annualized rate
for the Non-Pensionable Cash Payment to $750, we believe we
have equitably and sufficiently provided COLA benefits for

N

the employees^involved and that we have equitably and sufficiently modified the cost impact of our Award so as not to
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produce an undue hardship on the City and the Authority.
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel on February
7, 1979 issued the following Award:
A W A R D
1. The Housing Authority employees represented
by City Employees Union, Local 237, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, are entitled to a COLA
comparable to that provided in paragraph 3 . of
the Coalition Economic Agreement. Said employees shall be paid that fully pensionable
COLA in accordance with the following payment
schedule :
a)
b)

$300 effective January 1, 1979 and
an additional $141 effective January 1,
1980.

2. Those Housing Authority employees represented
by City Employees Union, Local 237, IBT, who are
eligible for the Non-Pensionable Cash Payment
(as described in paragraph 5. of the Coalition
Economic Agreement) shall receive said Payment
at the rate of $750 per year effective January
1, 1979.
This Opinion is

joined to and made a part of the Award

issued in this case on February 7, 1979.
DATED:

New York, New York
February 26, 1979

ARVID ANDERSON

WALTERS. EISENBERG

ERIC J/ SCHMERTZ

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 1930 District Council 37
AFSC&ME

AWARD
Case #1339 0052 78

and
New York Public Library

The Undersigned having been duly sworn and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the above named parties makes
the following AWARD:
The credible evidence persuasively establishes
that for the short period of his employment
from June 29, 1978 until his discharge on
August 4, 1978, the grievant Kirjath Spence,
was insubordinate and disrespectful to an uncooperative with supervision; intrusive and
indecorous with other employees, and had
demonstrated difficulty meeting the attendance
and punctuality requirements of his job.
I find that this adds up to what the Library
contends is "conduct unbecoming a library
employee" and constitutes grounds for dismissal.
Therefore the discharge of Kirjath Spence was
for just cause, and his grievance is denied.

DATED: February
1979
STATE OF New York )gs .
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz

On this
day of February, 1979, before me personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 453, IUE
OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
Otis Elevator Company

The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the disposition of the Union's
grievance No. 4880 dated January 15, 1976?
A hearing was held at the Company plant on September 12, 1979
at which time rperesentatives of the Union and Company appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's

Oath was waived.
Union Grievance No. 4880 reads:
The Company has violated the contract Article
IX Section 7. The Company has laid off various
men from twenty three department
There is no
lack of work. The Company continues to send
dies and fixtures to various vendors while these
men are laid off.
At the hearing the Union asserted that Section 6 as well as
Section 7 of Article IX had been violated and that its grievance
actually protested the Company's failure to "recall" on or around
January 15, 1976, employees who had been laid off from the tool
room the previous October and November.
Based on the record, the Union's case is in the alternative.
While it concedes the Company's general right to subcontract, it
contends that that right is restricted if it "causes a layoff"
or if there are employees on layoff who could be recalled to

-2perform that work in the plant.

In either circumstance, claims

the Union, the Company's right to subcontract is barred by the
second paragraph of Section 7 of Article IX which in pertinent
part accords the Company the
right to layoff employees because of lack
of work.
In the instant case the Union asserts that at the time the
affected employees were laid off from the tool room, work which
they could perform was subcontracted (evidenced by the return of
work from the subcontractor around February); that that work
should have remained in the plant; and that significant overtime
was worked by the remaining employees, all of which should have
foreclosed the layoff.

Additionally and alternatively, the Union

claims that on or around January 15, 1976, when the grievance was
filed, work was further subcontracted and significant overtime
again was scheduled for the remaining bargaining unit employees
warranting the recall of some of the laid off employees.
Also, the Union argues that Section 6 of Article IX is a
"two-way street", and that the obligation placed on the Union by
that clause to "cooperate with the Employe r in an effort to reduce
waste" is also binding on the Company.

It contends that in

the instant case the Company subcontracted work at a greater
expense then it would have cost to have it produced by the bargain
ing unit and hence is itself guilty of "waste" in violation of
Section 6.
I deem Section 6 inapplicable to this case.

By its terms

it is a promise by the Union to the Company that the Union will

-3-

cooperate in reducing "waste".

It places no reciprocal obligation

on the Company, and in the absence of any explicit language therein creating any such reciprocal or mutual promise, none should be
implied or legislated by the arbitrator.

Also, it is well

settled that subcontracting may be justified (in the absence of
a contract restriction) on grounds other than cost, such as the
need for expedition, the existing work load of the bargaining unit
and the availability of equipment.
where there is no explicit contract

The Union has not shown herein,
restriction on subcontracting,

that none of these factors were involved.

Indeed, most significantly

the Union's assertion that the subcontracting was "more expensive"
was based solely on what some foreman allegedly told a Union
witness.

As such, without the requisite particularization, it

falls short of what would constitute probative evidence on that
point.
I find that I do not have to decide whether the second paragraph of Section 7 of Article IX is a restriction on the Company's
right to subcontract in circumstances of layoffs and recall.

For

even assuming the validity of the Union's contractual theory, the
Union has not established herein that at the time of the disputed
layoff in October and November, 1975 the work which then was or
may have been subcontracted, was work which the laid off employees
could perform and/or was in sufficient quantity to nullify the
reduction in force.

Also, the Union has not shown that on or

around January 15, 1976 when the grievance was filed, the work
then returned or returning from subcontractors was within the

-4capability of the bargaining unit or in sufficient quantity to
justify recall.

Additionally, the Union's argument regarding the

schedule of "significant overtime" similarly fails because it is
not shown that significant overtime was scheduled or worked at
either of the critical times - when the layoffs occurred or when
the grievance was filed.
The record shows that the work returned by the vendor in
February, 1976 was for the most part carbide dies, which conceded)
cannot and have never been made by the bargaining unit.

Hence at

the time of the layoff, the subcontracted work (if it was the work
returned by the vendor in or around February as claimed by the
Union) was neither the type nor in the quantity jusitifying
reversal of the layoff, even under the Union's contractual theoryj
Inasmuch as the same carbide dies returned to the Company in
February, 1976 are relied on by the Union in support of its claim
that employees should have been recalled in January, 1976, the
Union's case on that point is similarly

faulty.

The balance of the work subcontracted took place during the
months subsequent to January 1976 and hence, in the absence of
other evidence, cannot be deemed to be "available work" for the
bargaining unit in January when the Union claims the recall should
have been made.
Based on the foregoing the settlement of grievance No. 4668
is simply not applicable to the facts in the instant case.
As to the overtime argument, the facts do not support the
Union's assertion.

Rather than "significant" or "heavy" overtime,

the evidence shows that little or no

overtime was worked by the
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bargaining unit employees of the tool room during the critical
period from October 1975 through January 1976.

The Union's

explanation that those periods may not show an accurate record of
overtime because overtime hours are not specifically recorded
when an entire department is scheduled to work extra hours, is
unclear, unsupported by requisite proof, and hence indeterminative
Finally the Union states that it has been impeded in proving
its case by the Company's refusal to produce certain production
and subcontracting records which the Union sought prior to the
arbitration hearing, and suggests that the Arbitrator draw
inferences unfavorable to the Company because of that refusal.
Without determining the scope or relevancy of the data requested,
the Arbitrator must note that the Union did not ask him to direct
the Company to produce the data, nor did the Union exercise its
subpeona power under the arbitration statute of the State of
New York.

Moreover the dispute over the production of that data

is the subject of a NLRB proceeding, with an adjudicatory hearing
scheduled in the future.

Therefore without prejudice to the

rights of the parties in that proceeding, and under the circumstances present, I must reject the Union's suggestion that
inferences unfavorable to the Company be drawn.

The fact is that

under these circumstances, I draw no inferences, one way or the
other.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named parties
makes the following AWARD

-6-

Union Grievance No. 4880 dated January 15,
1976 is denied.
The balance of the Arbitrator's fee for the
first hearing at which Union counsel did not
appear is assessed against the Union. The
Arbitrator's fee for the second hearing shall
be shared equally.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: September 24, 1979
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this twenty fourth day of September, 1979 before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Home Office Employees Local H-63,
IATSE, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330 1075 78

and
Paramount Pictures Corporation

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the agreement
between the parties dated December 22,
1976 by involuntarily transferring
Ralph Gutierrez for disciplinary reasons
from the second shift to the first shift
effective August 21, 1978, and if so what
shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held on April 23 and May 16, 1979 at which
time representatives of the above named Union and Company and
Mr. Gutierrez, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant",
appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The involuntary transfer referred to in the stipulated
issue was the disciplinary penalty which the Company imposed on
the grievant for his alleged insubordinate refusal to perform a
work assignment on July 28, 1978.

The grievant and the Union on

his behalf dispute the insubordination charge and assert, alternatively, that an involuntary transfer from one shift to another
is an impermissible disciplinary penalty.
Based on the record before me I am persauded that the
grievant, who is classified as a EOT Coordinator, did in fact

-2refuse to perform certain work on a computer when he was repeatedly
directed to do so by his supervisor on July 28, 1978.

It is

immaterial whether that assignment was within his job classification because it did not fall within the limited exceptions to
the well settled rule that an employee must perform duties as
assigned and then grieve the propriety of the assignment.

It is

equally well settled that an insubordinate refusal to carry out
a work order is a serious offense for which a disciplinary penalty,
including discharge is warranted.
Therefore the issue in the instant case, narrows to the
gravamen

of this dispute, namely whether the Company had the right

to discipline the grievant, not by a traditional penalty of suspension or discharge, but by transferring

him from the second

shift to the first shift in the same job classification, but with
the attendant pay loss of the shift differential.
Though the penalty imposed is unorthodox, I am not prepared to conclude, under the particular circumstances of this case
that it was either improper or violative of the collective bargaining agreement.

The contract is silent on disciplinary pen-

alties except for the penalty of discharge which must be justified
by "just cause."

Manifestly however, this does not mean that the

Company may not impose lesser penalties such as warning and/or
suspension.

And in my view, if the circumstances warrant, and

if there are relevant legitimate reasons, there is no contract bar
to an involuntary
reasons.

transfer from one shift to another for disciplin ry

Put another way, in the absence of an express contract

-3bar I see no reason why the Company should be prohibited from
transferring between shifts for disciplinary reasons when the
purpose and rationale for the transfer are reasonably related to
the offense committed.
I conclude that in the instant case this latter test has
been met.

In addition to the offense of July 28, 1978, the

grievant had had prior difficulties of a similar nature including
an incident in October 1975, when he directed obscene, abusive
and insubordinate language to his supervisor, for which he was
first discharged but which was mitigated to an eight day suspension following intervention on his behalf by the Union.

That in-

cident and penalty which was not then grieved may not now be
disputed in this proceeding.

Between that misconduct and the

instant offense there were other difficulties between the grievant
and supervision which have been substantiated in the record.

The

Company explains, and I accept the explanation as valid, that in
addition to imposing the transfer from the second shift to the
first shift as a disciplinary penalty, it was done also to put
the grievant in a different and better structured supervisory
setting.

One of the purposes of discipline short of discharge is

to attempt rehabilitation.

Though the rehabilitative potential

of such a transfer is of course speculative, nonetheless the
possibility of that effect constitutes some reasonable basis for
the use of that approach, in addition to the fact that it is a
penalty.

Hence, on that limited basis, namely the proximate

relationship between the offense committed and the purpose of the
transfer, and again in the absence of any explicit contract pro-

-4hibition, I cannot find contractual fault with the Company's
action.
That there has been a long standing practice, based on a
verbal understanding, that employees will not be involuntarily
transferred from one shift to another, is not material to this
case.

That agreement, which I find in fact was made and which

has been evidenced by long standing implementation is limited to
involuntary transfers for operational purposes.

The parties did

not discuss nor did they in any way deal with the question of
transfers for purposes of discipline as part of that agreement.
Therefore it is simply not applicable to this special situation.
Accordingly, the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator and having been duly sworn and having duly heard the
proofs and allegations of the above named parties makes the
following AWARD:
Limited to and under the particular circumstances of this case the Company did not
violate the agreement between the parties
dated December 22, 1976 by involuntarily
transferring Ralph Gutierrez for disciplinary
reasons from the second shift to the first
shift effective August 21, 1978.

DATED: June 14, 1979
STATE OF New York )sg .
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz

On this fourteenth day of June, 1979 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 376, UAW

OPINION AND AWARD

and
Product Identification Corporation

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate Article IV of
the contract by refusing to pay Philip
Boudreau holiday pay for November 23rd
and November 24th, 1978? If so what shall
be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Hartford, Connecticut on July 19,
1979 at which time Mr. Boudreau, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant", and representatives of the above named Union and
Company, appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

In accordance with statute the Oath of office was

administered to the Arbitrator.
The grievant claims that he did not work his scheduled shift
the day immediately precending and following the holidays of
Thanksgiving Day and the day after Thanksgiving

for the reason

that he was sick; and that he sustained an accident in his immediate
family; and that his absence did not adversely affect production
requirements; all within the meaning of Sections (a) (b) and (d)
of Article IV of the contract.
Subsequent to the hearing, the Union and Company stipulated
that the Arbitrator was not to consider the grievant's allegation
of an accident in his immediate family (the assertion that his
mother broke her hip in a fall and was hospitalized) in determining

-2his eligibility for holiday pay, because the facts of that claim were
not presented by the grievant during the course of the grievance
procedure, nor "had any information of this nature

ever been

given to the Company" prior to the hearing.
The evidence has shown that the grievant's absences prior
to and following the two holidays adversely affected production
requirements.

Testimony by the Company that a certain job order

for the Bostich Company was delayed beyond the scheduled delivery
date because of the grievant's absence, stands unrefuted.

Con-

sequently the excetion set forth in Paragraph (d) cannot be reliec
on to establish the grievant's eligibility for the holiday pay.
The issue is therefore narrowed to whether the grievant
was ill within the meaning of Paragraph (a) on his scheduled
working days preceeding and following the holidays.

In pertinent

part Paragraph (a) requires that the "absence (be) justified by
a bona fide illness" (emphasis added).

As the details of an illness

are within the knowledge of the employee affected, the burden
rests with the employee, and in this case with the grievant, to
demonstrate the bona fides of any

claimed illness.

Based on the

record before me I cannot find that the Company acted unreasonably
or arbitrarily in concluding that the grievant was not ill on
both of the requisite working days within the meaning of Paragraph
(a) of Article IV.

In short the grievant did not meet his burden

of establishing the bona fides of his illness on both days to
the reasonable satisfaction of the Company, and has not met that
burden in this arbitration proceeding.

-3Assuming the accuracy of the grievant's testimony that he
became ill following his return from a hunting trip and that he
was still ill on the working day prior to the Thanksgiving
Holiday, I am not persuaded, nor is there probative evidence to
show, that his illness continued through both holidays and the
succeeding work day.
Though his allegation that his mother fell, broke a hip
and went to the hospital for an operation is not to be considered
by the arbitrator in judging the grievant's eligibility for
holiday pay within the exception set forth in Paragraph (b), it
is relevant in determining the grievant's physical condition on
Thanksgiving, the day following Thanksgiving and the first working day thereafter.

By his own testimony, following his mother's

fall on November 20th, his time was fully consumed making arrange
ments for her care, hospitalization

and convalescence.

In his

telephone conversations during that period with the secretaries
in the Company's office, he spoke of "problems with his mother"
(without specifying the nature of the accident or hospitalization
but made no mention or claim that he was ill.

I think it most

likely that if he were sick, as well as caring for his mother,
he would have mentioned both circumstances, particularly when as
here, he was cautioned by one of the secretaries regarding the
contract requirements for holiday pay.
Additionally, though the contract does not require
employees to verify illnesses with a statement from a physician,
the letters from Dr. Nakhoul of December 1, 1978 and January 11,

-41979 (Union Exhibits 1 and 2) are not helpful in meeting the
grievant's burden of establishing the bona fides of the claimed
illness.

Neither verify the grievant's claimed illness of

November 22nd.

Rather they merely confirm that he called the

doctor on that day, claiming that he was sick and that medication
was prescribed over the phone.

That the grievant was seen by the

doctor on subsequent dates does not answer the question of whethei
he was sick on the critical days involved in this case.
Considering the stipulations entered into by the parties;
the grievant's testimony of his activities on behalf of his
mother; and the nature of the grievant's telephone conversations
with secretarial personnel at the Company, I conclude that though
the grievant may have been ill beginning November 20th, following
his weekend hunting trip (and his illness on that day is supported
by the testimony of an assistant foreman with whome he had gone
hunting), I conclude that the illness did not persist to and
through subsequent days, or not to the extent that would have
prevented him from coming to work at least on the day following
the holiday.

Rather I conclude that he took subsequent time off

to take care of what he told the Company were "problems concerning his mother."

Inasmuch as the allegation that his mother

suffered a broken hip and was hospitalized has been ruled out of
consideration in determining the grievant's eligibility for holiday
pay, I must conclude that the grievant has failed to show that he
was ill during the full relevant period and hence has not

-5established eligibility for the holiday pay under the terms of
the contract.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above named parties makes the following
AWARD:
The Company did not violate Article IV
of the contract by refusing to pay
Philip Boudreau holiday pay for November
23rd and November 24th, 1978.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: August 23, 1979
STATE OF New York )gg .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this twenty-third day of August, 1979, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local

2060

IBEW

AWARD
Case #1330 0963 78

and
Public Service Electric and Gas
Company

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrators, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, make the following AWARD:
The grievance relating to the termination of Lewis Brown is no longer
arbitrable.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

David A. Helming
Concurring

Joseph L. Jasmine
Dissenting
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DATED: March
1979
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

S'

On this
day of March, 1979, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

DATED: March
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1979

On this
day of March, 1979, before me personally
came and appeared David A. Helming to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

DATED: March
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1979

On this
day of March, 1979, before me personally
came and appeared Joseph L. Jasmine to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local

2060

IBEW

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
Case #1330 0963 78

and
Public Service Electric and Gas
Company

The stipulated issue is:
Is the grievance arbitrable? If so,
was the termination of Lewis Brown
for proper cause under the terms of
the agreement?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration
Association on December 11, 1978 at which time representatives
of the above named Union and Company appeared.

All concerned

were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Undersigned

served as Chairman of the Board of Arbitration.

Messrs.

David

A. Helming and Joseph L. Jasmine served respectively as the
Company and Union designees on the Arbitration Board.

The

Arbitrators' Oath was waived.
The Board of Arbitration met in executive session on March
1, 1979.
ARBITRABILITY
The instant grievance was processed through the contract
grievance steps, preliminary to arbitration by November 22, 1977
By letter dated December 1, 1977 the Union informed the Company
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that it intended to submit

the dispute to arbitration.

The Union formally submitted the grievance to the American
Arbitration Association for arbitration some 256 days later,
on August 14, 1978.
In contesting arbitrability, the Company raises essentially
the same arguments and contract references it relied on in a
prior matter between the same parties and before me (as Chairman)
(System Council U-2 IBEW -and- Public Service Electric and Gas
Company American Arbitration Association Case #1330 1036 73).
In response the Union defends on the grounds it asserted in that
same earlier case.
In that case, I followed an earlier decision of Arbitrator
George Moskowitz who found that neither the contract nor the
particular facts there involved required the Union to make timely
filing to the arbitration forum of a dispute that had completed
the grievance procedure unresolved.

I stated:

"Both cases put in issue the question
of whether under the contract the Union
is obligated to file for arbitration
within any specific time limit or within some reasonable time after the completion of the preliminary grievance steps.
In neither case was evidence or witnesses
unavailable nor had the memories of the
witnesses faded as a consequence of the
extended passage of time. Additionally,
in the instant case there is no "running"
liability...." (emphasis added)
In choosing not to reverse Arbitrator Moskowitz, I stated
inter alia
"Where the parties are the same, the same
contract language is in dispute, the facts
are substantially similar and where there
is sufficient evidence in support of the
prior arbitrator's decision or where the

-3contract is reasonably susceptible
to the interpretation which he places
on it, that prior decision should enjoy a presumption of validity
"
But I cautioned:
"
a stern word of caution to the
Union. Neither this determination
nor the Moskowitz decision should be
construed by the Union as a license
to delay, for extended and unreasonable
periods of time, the submission of
grievances to the arbitration forum
after the internal Union-Company grievance
steps have been completed.
It must be noted that Mr. Moskowitz
found no prejudice to the parties by
the delay, and similarly I found none
in the instant proceeding. But
not all my colleagues in the arbitration
profession accept that view. Therefore
it is quite possible that in (a) subsequent
case, though the facts and the contract
issue may be sufficiently similar, a
subsequent arbitrator may unhesitatingly
judge the timeliness question de novo and
differently, even to the point of rendering a decision contrary to Mr. Moskowitz'
and mine.
Additionally the facts in a subsequent case
may be different...„..making timeliness of
the filing for arbitration a highly relevant
factor."
(emphasis added)
Finally I stated:
"....the Union should bear in mind that a
course of conduct which once or twice may
be contractually tolerable may, if repeated,
constitute an abuse
and I believe that
a subsequent arbitrator (including this
arbitrator) would not hesitate to find a
grievance non-arbitrable and untimely if the
Union's reliance on the Moskowitz decision
and my decision reached the point of too wide
an application, constituting an abuse of the
latitude allowed by those rulings." (emphasis
added)
In the instant case the delay in submitting the grievance to
the arbitration forum was as excessive as in the two prior cases

-4aforementioned.

In the instant case there is an important fact

that distinguishes it from the matter before Mr. Moskowitz and
the prior case before me.

And that is that here there is running

liability because it involves a termination of employment and a
demand for reinstatement and back pay.

So that unlike the two

prior matters, there is potential prejudice to the Company by
unreasonable delay between the completion of the grievance steps
and the submission of the dispute to arbitration.

That the Union

asserts herein that the matter of back pay is within the discretion
and jurisdiction of the arbitration board means only that the
Company is not prejudiced if the Board declines to award back
pay.

But by being required to put the matter in the hands of the

arbitrators the Company runs the risk of an adverse ruling.

That

risk, present in the instant case significantly was not present
in the two prior matters and I consider that a "relevant factor."
This is now the third case of an excessive delay in submitting
a grievance to arbitration.

Despite my not so subtle hint in my

prior decision that I too would invoke the principle of laches
in subsequent, relevant circumstances, the parties selected me
as Chairman for the instant case.

Under that circumstance, and

in view of what I have previously said, both herein, and in my
prior decisions, the burden is on the Union to "show cause" why
my prior words of warning should not be implemented into a ruling.
In short I conclude that the Union must come forward and show
good and acceptable reasons justifying this the third time it
has delayed so long in taking a grievance to arbitration.
Union has failed to meet the burden.
to explain the delay.

The

No special reason is offered

That the Union was preparing for or
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engaged in contract negotiations at the time does not mean that
it could not have filed the case for arbitration.

The two

activities are hardly mutually inconsistent nor is one preemptive of the other.

At the risk of triteness, and to use the

baseball analogy, this is the Union's "third strike."
Accordingly I conclude and hold that the grievance is not
arbitrable.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman
Dated: March

1979

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
System Council,

IBEW

A W A R D
Case #1330 0708 78

and
Public Service Electric and Gas Company

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrators, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties make the following AWARD:
At the six named generating stations,
the Company's change in practice with
respect to overtime meal allowances
was not in violation of Article V Section
L (1) of the contract and Personnel
Instruction No. 3. Union grievances
1697, 1698, 1699, 1708, 1709 and 1742
are denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

Malcolm C. Sawhill
Concurring

Joseph Lo Jasmine
Dissenting
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DATED: March
1979
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this day of March
1979, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

DATED: March
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1979

On this day of March
1979, before me personally came
and appeared Malcolm C. Sawhill to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same

DATED: March
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1979

On this day of March
1979, before me personally came
and appeared Joseph L. Jasmine to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
System Council,

OPINION
OF
CHAIRMAN
Case #1330 0708 78

IBEW

and
Public Service Electric and Gas Company

The stipulated issue is:
At six named generating stations, was
the Company's change in practice with
respect to overtime meal allowances
in violation of Article V Section L
(1) of the contract and Personnel
Instruction No. 3?
(The issue covers grievances 1697,
1698, 1699, 1708, 1709 and 1742).

A hearing was held at the offices of the American
Arbitration Association on December 4, 1978 at which time
representatives of the above named Company and Union appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

Messrs. Joseph L.

Jasmine and Malcolm C. Sawhill served respectively as the Union
and Company designees to the Board of Arbitration.
signed served as Chairman of that Board.

The Under-

The Board of Arbitra-

tion met in Executive Session on February 26, 1979.

Article V Section L (1) reads:
Employees who are required to work for
more than two hours beyond the scheduled
quitting time shall be entitled to a meal
furnished or paid for by the Company and
to an additional meal for each additional
five hours worked thereafter.

-2Personnel Instruction No. 3, promulgated December 17, 1943
reads in pertinent part:
The allowance for meals shall be
85 cents.

It is undisputed that Personnel Instruction No. 3 has been
updated by Article V L (7) of the current collective bargaining
agreement which reads:
The allowance for meals shall be
$3.00 (effective May 1, 1978 $3.25 and effective May 1, 1979
$3.50).

In my Opinion in case #1330 1150 75 dated February, 1976
between the above named parties I stated:
"The parties well know that an arbitrator
is bound by the terms of the contract
when those terms are clear and unambiguous,
regardless of any past practice to the
contrary."

I find the foregoing contract provisions, namely Article V
Section L (1 and 7) to be clear and unambiguous.

They mean that

if the Company does not furnish a meal under the circumstances
set forth in Section L it is to pay the eligible employees the
amount of money set forth in Section L (7).

That meal allowance provision, included as it is in the
collective bargaining agreement between the Company and the
System Council on behalf of the various local Unions, is
applicable company-wide and is uniform for all of the Company's
locations and generating stations.

It does not provide for or

contemplate local variations depending on local eircuiBstances.

-3Therefore, at those generating stations where the Company did
not furnish or no longer furnished a meal, and where employees
were directed or required to take meals at restaurants and where
those meals were paid for by the Company or the employees were
reimbursed in amounts in excess of the stipulated contract
allowance, a practice developed and obtained that was contrary
to the contract terms.

However, no matter how long these

variations persisted, they cannot preempt or supersede the
clear but contrary contract language.

Therefore, in this case,

the Company had the right to terminate practices that differed
from the contract and to require, prospectively, explicit
adherence to the negotiated terms regarding meal allowances.
In this case there was no showing or even a contention that
the restaurants

or non-Company eating facilities at those

generating stations where the employees received a higher meal
allowance than provided for in the contract or where the
Company paid for meals in excess of that allowance, were more
expensive than non-Company meal facilities at other generating
stations which adhered to the contract allowance.
If there are differing conditions at various Company location
which warrant different arrangements regarding the payment of a
meal allowance, that is a matter for collective bargaining between the parties and not for arbitration.
Accordingly I find no contract violation or violation of
the Personnel Instruction by the Company's change in practices
with regard to the overtime meal allowance.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local

2060

IBEW
and

AWARD
Case #1330 0963 78

Public Service Electric and Gas
Company

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrators, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, make the following AWARD:
The termination of Lewis Brown is changed
to a disciplinary suspension. He shall be
reinstated without back pay and the period
of time from his termination to his reinstatement shall be deemed the disciplinary
suspension.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

David A. Helming
Concurring
Dissenting

Joseph L. Jasmine
Concurring
Dissenting

-2DATED:
STATE OF New York

)_,

oo •

COUNTY OF New York )

On this
of
1979, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF
On this
of
1979, before me personally came
and appeared David A. Helming to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF
On this
of
1979, before me personally came
and appeared Joseph L. Jasmine to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local

2060

IBEW

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
Case No.1330 0963 78

and
Public Service Electric and Gas
Company

Following the arbitrability Award in the above matter, the
parties reinstated the authority of the Board to make a determination of the issue on the merits.

A Board meeting was held on

April 16, 1979.
I agree with the Company that the only probative medical
evidence in the record is the medical testimony offered by the
Company.

Consequently

I am persuaded that the grievant was

medically capable and therefore should have returned to work on
the date fixed by the Company.

However, I also think it probable

that he did not do so, not in willful defiance of the Company's
authority, but because he was or thought he was under the instructions of his own doctor that he was not yet to return to work.
Under that circumstance and particularly because there was
a relatively short period of time between when the Company instruc
ted him to return to work (when he should have or should have made
an attempt to do so) and when his own doctor indicated when he
would be able to do so, I conclude he should be disciplined, but
short of dismissal.

In my judgement, the appropriate penalty is

a suspension for the period of time from his termination to his
restoration to work.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Revere Division,

Local 168

UAW

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1130 1840 78

and
Revere Copper and Brass, Inc.
New Bedford Division

The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the disposition of
Grievance No. C185230 dated July
10, 1978?
A hearing was held at the Company offices in New Bedford,
Massachusetts on February 5, 1979 at which time representatives
of the above named Union and Company appeared and were afforded
full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses. The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
Grievance No. C185230 reads:
It is the Union's contention that
Angelo Calheta (1212) does have
an eight hour job on the 8-4 shift.
The combining of job 12-8 plus 8-4
shifts is against contract and another form of harassment toward this
employee.
The Union's complaint is that the Company violated the contract and my prior Award of February 21, 1978 when it combined
the job of sheet mill order chaser (of the 8-12 shift) with the
job of sheet mill furnace lighter (of the 4-8 shift) creating
the combined job sheet mill order chaser-sheet mill furnace
lighter to be worked during the 4 AM to 12 noon shift; that the
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combination deprived grievant Calheta of a job because, undisputedly, he is medically unable to tolerate the fumes attendant to the furnace lighter duties; that the combination was unnecessary because the grievant was fully occupied as an order
chaser-overhauler; and that the Company made the new combination
to "harass" the grievant and force him out of active employment
after being required to reemploy him with back pay pursuant to
my prior Award.
Additionally, and in the alternative, the Union contends
that the Company was required under Article VI Section (13)(d)(I)
of the contract to grant the grievant the job of hand overhauler
which the Company posted but did not fil!0
There is no evidence in the record of "harassment" or any
effort by the Company to deprive the grievant of active employment.

On the contrary, the record indicates that prior to and

during his layoff following the new job combination, the Company
conferred with Union representatives and made a good faith effort
to consider the grievant for a job or job combinations which he
might be able to perform and which would consume a full days work
This effort continued into the arbitration hearing, during which
the Company showed a willingness to look into that possibility.
In my prior Award of February 21, 1978 I barred the Company
from making an interdepartmental combination of jobs.

However,

I explicitly stated that I was persuaded the Company had bona
fide economic reasons to make job combinations to provide full
duties for incumbent employees, and that job combinations within
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the same department were not barred by the contract.

In the

instant case the Company has combined two jobs that fall within
the same department.

That combination, as I stated previously,

is not violative of the contract.

That the two jobs combined

had been separately worked on different shifts is also not a
contract breach.

The contract does not fix the shift hours of

any particular job or combination of jobs.

On the contrary

Article V provides that:
The regularly established work week
shall include any hours between 12:
00 midnight Sunday to 12:00 midnight
the following Sunday, (emphasis added)
The instant combination of order chaser and furnace lighter
is to be worked during the foregoing contract hours, and hence
it is not a contract violation that the new shift established
for the combined job differs from the respective shifts worked
when the jobs were separate.
With the Company's right affirmed in my prior decision to
combine jobs within the same department, I cannot contractually
fault the Company's action in establishing a combined job which
the grievant was medically incapable of performing, even if it
meant eliminating the job duties which he did and could perform
up to that point.

Supportive of this right is evidence in the

record that the grievant's prior duties were not officially as
an order chaser-overhauler but rather as an order chaser with
additional duties assigned from the overhauler classification to
fill out his work day, in immediate response to and compliance
with my prior Award.

Moreover and modparticularly, the Company

-4in this proceeding, as it did previously, has shown its current
economic difficulties and the continuing need to combine jobs
to provide a full days work for its declining work force in the
face of declining business.

Here, statistics offered by the

Company show that a combination of order chaser and overhauler
did not or would not constitute full employment on a continuing
basis.

Accordingly a new and different intra-departmental

combination, order chaser and furnace lighter was economically
justified, as well as permitted under the contract, and by my
prior Award.
Finally, I must deny the Union's claim that the grievant
was entitled to the job of overhauler.

I do not read Article

VI Section (13)(d)(I) to require the Company to fill a job which
it has posted and for which there are no bids.

Rather, I read

it to mean that if the Company posts a job for bids, and there
are no bidders, and it decides to fill the job nonetheless, it
must give the job to:
"an employee whose regular job is
suspended due to business activity

. . • • it•

In the instant case the job of overhauler was posted; there
were no bids; but the Company decided not to fill it.

I accept

the Company's testimony that subsequent to the posting it learned and decided that the job was unnecessary and not warranted by
available work.

It is well settled that an employer need not

fill a job vacancy which he does not need.

That well settled

rule is implicit within the meaning and interpretation of
Article VI Section (13)(d)(I).
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For all the foregoing reasons the Union's grievance is
denied.
Without in any way changing the foregoing ruling, it is
recommended that the parties continue to explore jobs or job
combinations which the grievant can perform.

He has been a long

service employee who is entitled to that consideration.

His

present medical status and medical limitations are not clear.
He apparently is willing to try to work at various jobs, but is
foreclosed by the diagnosis of a doctor selected by the Company.
I think that he should be reexamined with the duties of the job
or jobs under consideration called specifically to the doctor's
attention, so that the grievant's present disabilities, if any,
can be more precisely ascertained.

I would hope that the

adoption of this recommendation would lead to his reemployment
in some full and productive capacity.
recommendation

Unless and until this

is implemented by the discretionary action of

the Company my Award, as follows shall obtain.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The Union's grievance No. C185230 dated
July 10, 1978 is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
DATED: February
,1979
STATE OF New York , )_
o
. oo • ,
COUNTY OF New York )
On this
day of February, 1979, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
—•—-» — — — — ™ — — — — __—.—.•. — -«_™. — _ — _ — _ _ . « ^ _ . „ _ _ « _ « _ .

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Roosevelt Teachers Association

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1739 0304 78

and
Roosevelt Union Free School District
The stipulated issue is:
Did the disputed duties assigned to
Roosevelt Teachers Association President Joan Phillips during the school
year 1978-1979 violate Article XVIII
Section B8 of the contract? If so what
shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the school District
on April 5, 1979 at which time representatives of the above named
parites appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
Article XVIII Section B8 reads:
The RTA President shall be relieved of all
duty periods. A secondary teacher who is
president of RTA shall have a reduced teaching load by one period daily. An elementary
teacher who is president of the RTA shall
have his/her teaching day reduced by 90 consecutive minutes.
Ms. Phillips is an elementary teacher.

The District assert

that the last sentence of the foregoing contract clause is the
totality of the time and duties for and from which she will be
relieved.

The Association asserts that the first sentence of the
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foregoing clause also applies to all incumbent presidents of the
RTA whether secondary teachers or elementary teachers, and therefore Ms. Phillips is entitled to released time not only for 90
consecutive minutes referred to in the last sentence but is to
be excused also from "all duty periods" as provided in the first
sentence.

Hence the Association seeks an Award directing the

District to relieve Ms. Phillips from certain "duties" she is
presently required to perform.
Based on the record I am persuaded that although there are
certain "duties" required of an elementary teacher, the elementary schools and elementary teachers do not have "duty periods"
within the meaning of the first sentence of Article XVIII Section
B8 of the contract.

The history of the negotiations of that

Section of the contract supports this conclusion.

Before

an

elementary teacher was president of the RTA and when that position was occupied by a secondary teacher, the predecessor contracts did not contain the last sentence of Section B8.
Section was expressly negotiated
presidency of the RTA.

That

when Ms. Phillips assumed the

Obviously there must have been something

different about her work assignments and the schedules in the
elementary schools which required an addition to the previous
language of Section B8.

Otherwise the newly negotiated last

sentence would be unnecessary, and the first two sentences could
have obtained just as well to Ms. Phillips as it did to her
predecessor who came from a secondary school.

Though the fore-

-3going contract clause is not artfully worded, and could be
construed to accord all RTA presidents released time from duty
periods, I am satisfied that the first sentence was not intended
to apply in the event that the RTA president was an elementary
teacher.

In addition to the reason already expressed, namely

that the last sentence was negotiated to cover the different
work assignments and schedules of an elementary teacher, the
evidence further shows that the "90 consecutive minutes" accorded
Ms. Phillips, is roughly equal to the total amount of released
time granted her predecessor, who was a secondary teacher, including the latter's release from duty periods.

In my judgement

to grant the Association's grievance in this case would be to
give Ms. Phillips more released time than was enjoyed by her
predecessor, and I do not believe that was intended.

Finally,

based on the testimony and evidence, I conclude that the term
"duty periods" has the definite meaning of a specific, scheduled,
continuous amount of time equal to a class period and comparable
to the schedule and time allotted to an academic subject.

That

type of "duty period" is simply not part of the schedule or an
assignment in the elementary schools; but rather is found in the
secondary schools.

I am not satisfied that "duties" such as

"home room duty, before class duty and recreational duty after
lunch", which Ms. Phillips is required to perform, are duty
periods within the aforementioned definition or within the meaning of that phrase as set forth in the first sentence of Section
B8.

-4Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties makes the following AWARD
The disputed duties assigned to Roosevelt
Teachers Association President Joan Phillips
during the school year 1978-1979 did not
violate Article XVIII Section B8 of the
contract.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATE: May 29, 1979
STATE OF New York )gg .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this twenty ninth day of May, 1979 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Engineers Union, Local 444,
International Union of Electrical
Radio, and Machine Workers, AFLCIO
and

OPINION AND AWARD

Sperry Division of Sperry Rand
Corporation

In accordance with Article 26 Section F of the collective
bargaining agreement between the above named Union and Company,
the Undersigned was selected as the Arbitrator to hear and
decide the following stipulated issue:
What shall be the disposition of the
Union's grievance No. 76-12?
A hearing was held at the Company offices on March 19, 1979
at which time representatives of the Union and Company appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Oath was waived.

The Arbitrator's

Post-hearing briefs were filed.

Despite contentions to the contrary I find the critical
contract language, namely Schedule D Sections 1, 2 and 3 and the
Memorandum of Understanding

dated October 31, 1976, considered

separately or jointly, to be unclear and logically susceptible
to either of the divergent interpretations advanced herein by
the Union and the Company.

Following the traditional approach

under such circumstances to find meaning and intent, an examination of the "legislative history" of the language when it was
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negotiated and its implementation thereafter lead me to conclude
that the Union is estopped from advancing an interpretation or
application different from what has been agreed to and/or accepte
by the other IUE local unions (Locals 445, 450 and 470).
It is a fact that the Union and the other locals aforementioned bargained jointly' with the Company and agreed to the
very same contract language and Memorandum of Understanding involved herein.
The Union acknowledges that at the time of those negotiations it had little interest in the Memorandum of Understanding
and/or its relationship to the relevant contract sections under
Schedule D.

Indeed, it is undisputed that the other local unions

made the demands and sought the benefits ultimately set forth in
the Memorandum of Understanding; that representatives of the
Union were present and heard those discussions, and that sometime subsequent to agreement with the other local unions, the
Memorandum and its provisions were automatically and uniformly
included as part of the contract bargain with the Union at the
Union's request and as a consequence of joint bargaining.
ever it is undisputed that when so incorporated

How-

there were no

discussions between the Company and the Union regarding the
meaning and intent of these benefits different from the earlier
detailed discussions between the Company and the other locals.
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Indeed there were no substantive discussions on the subject at
all.
Hence, the meaning, intent and purpose of the critical
contract language and the Memorandum of Understanding, and the
interrelationship, if any, was cast by one or more of the other
local unions in negotiations with the Company, and not by the
Union herein.

It is significant to me that none of the other

locals have grieved or advanced an interpretive theory similar
to the claim of the Union herein or in any way different from
the position taken by the Company.

The local unions which were

responsible for the disputed language have not contested the
interpretation and application placed thereon by the Company.
Consequently, the meaning of the critical contract language and
Memorandum of Understanding is evidenced by what was agreed to
by the unions which undertook the substantive negotiations thereof and their subsequent acceptance of the Company's application
and implementation of those terms.
Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegation of
the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
The Union's grievance No. 76-12 is denied.

DATED: July 23, 1979
STATE OF New York )sg .
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

On this twenty-third day of July, 1979, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

